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UNITED STATES DEPENDENCE ON CARIBBEAN
BAUXITE AND THE FORMATION OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL BAUXITE ASSOCIATION
Michael Deal*
ROLE OF THE CARIBBEAN ALUMINUM SUPPLY IN
THE UNITED STATES
The aluminum industry plays a major role in the interdependence of
US-Caribbean relations. While the mining of bauxite (aluminum's basic
raw material component) represents a significant contribution to the
GNP of several Caribbean nations and garners valuable foreign
exchange for their small open economies, the United States is dependent
on imports of Caribbean bauxite and alumina (processed bauxite) to meet
its consumption needs for primary aluminum. Foreign imports of bauxite
and alumina comprise nearly ninety percent of U.S. industrial demand
for aluminum and the Caribbean has traditionally been the principal
supplier. A decade ago the Caribbean producers enjoyed a position of
almost total dominance of the U.S. market, controlling ninety-seven
percent of imports for 1966.
In recent years, however, new suppliers have emerged to accommo-
date the increased demand and have gradually eroded the Caribbean's
position, which in 1975 still represented sixty-two percent of total U.S.
imports of bauxite and alumina, expressed in aluminum equivalents.
There have also been frequent signs of increased friction between major
North American-based aluminum companies and the various Caribbean
* Agency for International Development. This paper is a revised version of a
study originally prepared for the U.S. Department of State under its External
Research Program.
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bauxite producing nations, such as the nationalization of aluminum
companies in Guyana; imposition, notably in Jamaica, of a levy based on
the ingot price of aluminum; the formation of the International Bauxite
Association; and Jamaica's move to gain majority control of the foreign
aluminum companies operating within her borders. In order to under-
stand the source of this friction and its effect on the aluminum industry,
the Caribbean bauxite-producing countries and the U.S. aluminum
supply, it is important to analyze the structure of the aluminum industry,
its relationship with the Caribbean governments and the significance of
the new International Bauxite Association (IBA).
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
The world aluminum industry is comprised of six large, vertically-
integrated firms - Alcan Aluminum Ltd., Aluminum Company of
America (Alcoa), Reynolds Metals Company, Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corp., Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann Group (PUK) and Swiss
Aluminum Ltd. (Alusuisse) - which own or have equity interests in over
fifty percent of world aluminum productive capacity, and about forty
other private companies, which own twenty to twenty-five percent of
aluminum productive capacity, frequently in association with one or more
of the six large firms. Governments of twenty-four countries own or have
equity interests in the remaining twenty-five percent.
Perhaps to an even greater degree than is the case worldwide, the
Caribbean bauxite industry has been owned and operated by a small
number of vertically-integrated North American aluminum companies
(except in Guyana, and then only since 1971). Capital and technology as
well as the market for the Caribbean bauxite industry are supplied by
these firms. Levels of production and the rates of investment and
expansion are matters of company policy, determined by the global
economics of the firm. In his analysis of the aluminum industry in the
Caribbean, Norman Girvan has noted that the bauxite producing
countries can be classified into "major suppliers" (Jamaica, Surinam and
Guyana) and "reserve suppliers" (the Dominican Republic and Haiti)
depending on the role assigned to them by the principal aluminum
companies.'
Reserve suppliers .... are not meant to develop large-scale
production. Their production is deliberately kept low and stagnant by
company fiat. Their role is to top up [sic] the company's bauxite
1. N. GIRVAN, CORPORATE IMPERIALISM: CONFLICT AND EXPROPRIATION 116
(1976).
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supplies from other sources and to act as insurance and a bargaining
counter in dealing with governments of the major suppliers. Thus, for
these countries, the basic bauxite-producing potential is deliberately
underdeveloped as a result of corporate integration.2
The "major supplier," on the other hand, have been destined to develop
large-scale production with an initial high growth rate which may last for
decades, but, after a certain point, will stabilize because the companies do
not wish to become overdependent on any one raw material source. For
the country involved, the end of the high-growth phase signals the onset
of maturity in its bauxite industry, perhaps even of stagnation. For
Guyana and Surinam, the high-growth phase lasted roughly from 1920 to
1950, while for Jamaica it ran roughly from 1950 to 1970.
INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP WITH CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS
AND THE ROLE OF THE IBA
Since the production technology is capital-intensive, wage and salary
costs plus local tax payments by the companies have represented a rather
small proportion of the total value of their operations. Capital allowances,
profits after tax and other capital charges are high, and since the capital
is foreign-owned, these accrue abroad rather than with the local economy.
One of the main problems faced by Caribbean governments in taxing
bauxite production has been the determination of company profits. No
genuine market exists for bauxite and there have been very few sales
between genuinely independent parties with equal market power. The
price of bauxite, therefore, has been determined by the integrated
aluminum companies which use a transfer pricing mechanism to ensure
that profits are made at whatever level in the production process is most
suitable.
Over the years the governments of the various Caribbean bauxite
- producing countries have tried several strategies for dealing with the
aluminum companies. First, attempts have been made by the govern-
ments to secure higher taxes from the companies; second, governments
have urged that the companies establish local alumina and aluminum
processing facilities; and third, negotiations have been entered into
seeking direct state participation in the ownership and management of
the subsidiary companies. A fourth strategy involves the creation of the
IBA - an association of producer countries which incorporates to one
degree or another the various strategies mentioned above.
In early 1974, the three major Caribbean bauxite suppliers, Jamaica,
Surinam and Guyana, joined with Guinea, Australia, Sierra Leone and
2. Id.
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Yugoslavia to form the IBA in an attempt to strengthen their negotiating
position vis-A-vis the aluminum companies. The Dominican Republic,
Haiti, Ghana and Indonesia have since joined the association, so that in
1975 IBA accounted for seventy-three percent of world bauxite production.
The major goals of the IBA are: a) to promote the orderly and rational
development of the bauxite industry; b) to secure for member countries
fair and reasonable returns from the exploitation, processing and
marketing of bauxite and its products for the economic and social
development of their peoples; and c) to safeguard the interests of member
countries in relation to the bauxite industry.
The IBA has emphasized the acquisition by each member country of
full knowledge and information concerning the functions and prospects of
the industry. These include knowledge about the potential of their own
resources and their position relative to other producers. Such information
then can be analyzed within the IBA to evaluate the effectiveness of their
control of resource supply. As an important step in this direction, a
majority of the IBA countries (Australia being a major exception) have
decided to purchase majority ownership of the local subsidiaries of the
foreign companies. In 1976 Jamaica was successful in negotiating an
arrangement with Alcoa in which six percent ownership of all Alcoa
operations in Jamaica, including alumina processing, was transferred to
the government. And in 1977 Jamaica negotiated fifty-one percent
ownership agreements with Kaiser Bauxite Company and Reynolds
Jamaica Mines. Negotiations are continuing with Alcan and the Alpart
consortium.
BAUXITE PRICES AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-IBA SUPPLIERS
Bauxite prices had remained roughly constant from 1960-71, but
since then, and in particular during 1975-76, bauxite prices have doubled
or even tripled in some cases. In the two year period, January
1974-January 1976, members of the IBA imposed tax levies that
increased the f.o.b. price of bauxite from around $8-$12 per ton to around
$20-$30 per ton. While the rise in tax levies was considerable, it is very
interesting to note how bauxite prices relate with other market forces in
the final price of aluminum ingot. Bauxite costs prior to 1974 typically
had accounted for ten percent of the final aluminum ingot price. The IBA
tax increases, even if they were passed fully forward, would have had an
impact of raising the ingot price by only six percent at prices that
prevailed in 1974. The price of aluminum in 1975, however, was about
sixty percent higher than in 1973 and eighteen percent higher than that
of 1974. (Aluminum prices increased from 25€/lb. in 1973 to almost
40¢/lb. in 1975.) Thus, apart from increases in the bauxite levy, which
formed less than fifteen percent of the final ingot price in 1975, increases
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in energy and labor costs have played a larger role in the price increases
of aluminum since 1974.
3
In May 1974, Jamaica became the first country to increase taxation on
bauxite production. Based on the volume of production and linked to the
market price of finished aluminum ingot, the new tax system has two
basic components. The first component is a standard royalty of fifty
Jamaican cents per long dry ton (LDT) of all bauxite mined. The rest of
the taxation consists of a production levy. The net effect of the new taxes
was to add about $12.75 per LDT to the bauxite cost calculated at the
aluminum price of $.39 per pound.4 In addition, each company is required
to produce a minimum tonnage of bauxite which is roughly equivalent to
ninety percent of the annual production of each company in 1974.
A differential tax structure exists in the various IBA member
countries. Although Jamaica's lead was followed by other Caribbean
producers, the tax pattern is not uniform; all other producers have opted
for lower rates than Jamaica. By the end of 1974, Surinam had secured an
agreement from Alcoa for the payment of a Jamaican type levy fixed at
six percent, yielding a revenue of $11.02 per LDT and raising the
government's total tax income from Alcoa from $18 million to $45 million
for 1974. In December 1974, Haiti announced that Reynolds had agreed to
a Jamaican-type levy of 7.5% which would raise per ton revenues to
approximately $11.00 (compared with $1.88 previously) and total revenues
to $11 million per year. The Congress of the Dominican Republic proposed
legislation that would almost double the bauxite royalty from $2.73 to
$5.00 per ton, with a minimum tax-reference price of $12.08 per ton, but
the President vetoed the legislation. Among the African producers,
Guinea introduced a variant of the Jamaican production levy and Sierra
Leone increased bauxite royalties from ten to twenty U.S. cents per ton
and imposed an income tax of sixty percent on the companies. Australia
seemed to be following the Jamaican lead in 1974 when the bauxite
royalty per LDT was increased from $.10 to $1.00 for exports and from
$.05 to $.50 for bauxite sold locally. However, the new arrangement of
March 1976 with Comalco, the country's largest bauxite producer, calls
for bauxite to be taxed like other minerals at the rate of ten percent of
their average export price. The arrangements nevertheless maintained
the minimum royalties already in effect at the time.5
3. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MARKET
STRUCTURE OF BAUXITE/ALUMINA/ALLUMINUM: PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, Commodity Paper No. 24, p 12 (March, 1977).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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This differential tax structure focuses attention on the limitations of
the IBA's bargaining power and the delicate internal balance which
exists between the Caribbean producers on the one hand, and members
like Australia which are less willing to ardently pursue IBA directives on
the other. The IBA countries, as mentioned earlier, control seventy-three
percent of world bauxite production, but this factor alone is not sufficient
to permit them to dictate significant future tax hikes as they were able to
do from 1974-76. There are several factors involved. First, the cohesive-
ness of the IBA is questionable. There is a wide variation in the bauxite
levies now in effect between the association's members, and especially
between the two largest producers - Jamaica and Australia. The
Caribbean suppliers enjoy the advantage of low transport costs because
of their proximity to the United States and thus were in a position to hike
their tax rates higher than were other IBA members. If the Caribbean
producers decide to further raise bauxite levies while other IBA members
do not, their share of the world market could be seriously eroded.
The position of the IBA and especially that of the Caribbean
members may also be seriously undermined by the emergence of new non-
IBA suppliers such as Brazil. In 1974 Brazil produced only 650,000 tons of
bauxite, but by the early 1980s the total planned production is expected to
exceed four million tons. Other non-IBA bauxite producing countries like
Cameroon, India and Malaysia are also considering major investments
for the development of their bauxite potential.
Finally, should the price of bauxite rise above a certain level, it would
become more economical for the major companies to produce alumina
from sources other than bauxite such as high-alumina clays, dawsonite,
alunite and anorthosite, all of which are in great abundance in the earth's
crust.
6
The preceding discussion leads one to the opinion that while the
Caribbean bauxite producers have made the longest strides among IBA
members in negotiations with the major companies over levies and
government participation, their present bargaining position has been
severely limited. And in terms of expanding production in the future, they
may in fact have placed themselves at a disadvantage with respect to
other producers in attracting new investment.
6. U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL FACTS AND PROBLEMS (1975). Alterna-
tives to bauxite as a source of aluminum presently do not possess the technology
nor the cost effectiveness to be competitive but should bauxite prices increase
significantly this situation would change. According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines,
before the end of this century a small but important percentage of new aluminum
production may be derived from such material. The U.S. has large resources of
such materials and could meet most of its aluminum raw material needs
indefinitely if the technology is developed.
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The immediate reaction of the companies to the imposition of the
production levy and plans for government participation by IBA members
was one of indignation. In Jamaica, Alcoa, Kaiser and Reynolds filed
arbitration requests with the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in addition to seriously considering a
switchover to other sources of bauxite or to non-bauxite sources of
alumina. The prospect of any major new investments in Jamaica are
remote if not non-existent as the industry's enthusiasm for cooperation
with its long-time partner has been dampened considerably. On the other
hand, mining operations have not been abandoned by the com-
panies. ICSID proceedings were terminated in October 1976, and
except for Revere Copper and Brass Inc.7 and the continuing negotiations
with Alcan and Alpart, the companies have agreed to grant Jamaica a
controlling interest in the aluminum producers' bauxite operations in
Jamaica and eventual control of its alumina operations as well. In return,
Jamaica agreed to drop the level of its production levy from 8.5% to the
1974 level of 7.5% of the average market price for finished aluminum
ingot. The companies also receive a guarantee of priority supply sufficient
to maintain current rates of extraction for forty years. Nevertheless, there
has been no major expansion in the Jamaican bauxite industry since the
1966-71 period when a new alumina processing capacity was installed.
The industry is in stalemate and will remain there as long as the
government continues to maintain its present stance towards the
companies and declines to offer them incentives and a stable investment
climate so as to encourage new investments.
As a result, Jamaica has decided to explore other alternatives for
expansion. Jamaica has an agreement with Mexico for an aluminum
smelter to be located in Mexico and an integrated alumina refinery
planned for Jamaica which would be a joint Jamaica/Venezuela/Mexico
venture (JAVEMEX) in which the Jamaican government would hold a
majority share. For various reasons the initiation of this plan has been
postponed. Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago had established a
joint agreement for construction of two aluminum smelters, one in
Trinidad and Tobago based on that island's natural gas and another in
Guyana based on the Mazaruni hydropower project which that country is
7. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. has instituted an arbitration demand with
the American Arbitration Association against OPIC. The claim filed against OPIC
was for $80.4 million, including $66.5 million expropriation compensation and
$13.9 million for reimbursement of levies paid to the Government of Jamaica,
based on Revere's bauxite mining and alumina refining facilities, which the
company shut down in August 1975, claiming that actions of the Government of
Jamaica were expropriatory.
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now developing. Negotiations broke down in 1977 and Guyana and
Trinidad have decided to go it alone. The high energy costs involved in
alumina refining and aluminum smelting are the major deterrent to new
large-scale investments in the Caribbean. The effect that the huge
petroleum import bills have had in recent years on all of the CARICOM
members except Trinidad and Tobago resulted in precarious financial
situations which virtually preclude winning major new investment
contracts, and thus their most practical option has become joint ventures
with energy-rich partners such as Mexico, Venezuela and Trinidad and
Tobago. For the short term at least, budgetary and fiscal pressures in
Jamaica and Guyana make even joint ventures unfeasible.
ANALYSIS FOR THE FUTURE
What conclusions does this analysis of the IBA and the relationship
between the aluminum industry and the Caribbean bauxite producing
countries have for future U.S. demand for imported bauxite and alumina?
Based on U.S. Bureau of Mines projections of demand for primary
aluminum in the year 2000, if domestic production is to maintain its
average rate of ten percent of total demand for the 1973-2000 period, a
total cumulative output of thirty-four million tons would be required. The
potential supply of aluminum from domestic reserves has been estimated
to be only ten million tons. Therefore, future U.S. aluminum demand will
become increasingly reliant on foreign imports until a marked improve-
ment over current technology for obtaining aluminum from non-bauxite
raw materials is achieved.8
However, recent trends in the U.S. market may have a significant
impact on US-Caribbean trade of these raw materials. Diversification of
suppliers continues to grow as new producers emerge and a greater
reliance has been placed on alumina imports than in the past which
signifies that the Caribbean suppliers will constitute a diminishing share
of overall U.S. foreign dependence for its aluminum supply as long as
they remain primarily exporters of bauxite. Countries like Australia and
perhaps Brazil in the future will gain ever larger shares of the U.S.
market as increased demand is met by alumina rather than bauxite. The
challenge for the Caribbean producers then becomes their ability to
attract investments for establishing expanded alumina processing
facilities. But as was mentioned earlier, the aluminum companies are
8. Figures are based on U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, MINERALS IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY: TEN-YEAR SUPPLY-DEMAND PROFILES FOR MINERAL AND FUEL
COMMODITIES (1966-75).
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skeptical of new investments in the Caribbean because of increased
government participation, high levies and uncertainty as to the future
business climate.
Thus the outlook for future US-Caribbean relations with respect to
the aluminum industry appears to be one of continued interdependence
with a gradual erosion of the Caribbean's position against competing
suppliers of bauxite and alumina.
